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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BAHMAN DADGARI, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
V .
 J 
NILOOFAR BAKTI, ; 
Defendant/Appellee. ' 
) Case No. 20020682-CA 
APPELLEE'S ANSWERING BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-2a-3 (2) (j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment to Appellee, Niloofar Bakti, 
finding that her foreclosure of the subject property was not barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Bahman Dadgari to prevent Niloofar Bakti from foreclosing a 
promissory note and trust deed on property located in Salt Lake County. The court ruled, on 
summary judgment, that Ms. Bakti was not barred from proceeding with the foreclosure. 
Bahman Dadgari appeals from that adverse ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. All of the parties involved are of Iranian descent, having come to Utah shortly 
after the Shah was deposed. Amir Hooshang Noshiravan and Fakhretaj Noshiravan 
(collectively the "Noshiravans") are husband and wife. Zahra Hajmohammadali ("Zahra") 
and Bahman Dadgari ("Bahman") are husband and wife. Bahman is the son of a good 
friend of the Noshiravans. Amir Farhang Noshiravan ("Farhang") and Niloofar Bakti 
("Niloofar") are the son and daughter respectively of the Noshiravans. 
2. The dispute involves a gas station and convenience store ("the Property) 
located on the Northwest corner of Highland Drive and 4500 South in Salt Lake City. 
3. In 1986, the Noshiravans and Zahra each purchased a one-half interest in the 
Property. Bahman and Farhang thereafter leased the Property and operated it pursuant to an 
agreement between them. 
4. Ultimately a dispute arose between Farhang and Bahman resulting in Bahman 
taking over the operation of the gas station and convenience store. Farhang sued Bahman 
and Zahra and obtained a judgment against them in 1994. Bahman claimed that he had no 
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assets and Zahra transferred her interest in the Property to Mansour Ariazand ("Ariazand"), 
ostensibly as security for loans Ariazand had made to Bahman. In 1995, Farhang brought 
an action against Zahra and Ariazand seeking to collect the funds that were due to him. 
5. When the Property was purchased, the Noshiravans and Zahra as owners and 
Bahman and Fahrang as tenants executed a $97,000.00 promissory note and trust deed in 
favor of U.S. Thrift & Loan (R. 48-54). In July, 1994, Niloofar purchased the note and trust 
deed from U.S. Bancorp, the successor to U.S. Thrift & Loan, and received an assignment 
of all the right, title and interest of the bank in the subject note and trust deed (R. 55). 
6. Bahman stopped paying rent, insurance, taxes and other expenses of the 
Property, but because the Noshiravans only owned an undivided half interest, they could not 
evict him. The last payment on the note was made in August, 1993. 
1. In 1994, Salt Lake County alleged that a gasoline spill had occurred on the 
Property and assessed cleanup costs against the owners. Bahman was occupying the 
Property during that time and was required to provide insurance that would have covered 
the spill, but he had failed to pay the premium. As a result, the County sued the 
Noshiravans, who in turn sued Bahman. 
8. In February, 1995, Niloofar commenced a non-judicial foreclosure action by 
recording a notice of default with the Salt Lake County Recorder (R. 57). 
9. In 1997, Salt Lake County announced that it would widen Highland Drive 
and condemn a portion of the Property for that purpose. 
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10. In December, 1997, the Noshiravans, Farhang, Ariazand, Bahman and Zahra 
entered into a settlement agreement ("Agreement") (R. 59-62) (see, Addendum). Under the 
terms of the Agreement, the parties attempted to resolve all of the issues that had arisen 
between them over the years. The Agreement was divided into two parts ("A" and "B"). 
Part A required Bahman and Zahra to pay $25,000.00 to satisfy the claim of the County Fire 
Department relating to the fuel spill and another $25,000.00 towards Farhang's judgment 
against them. Part B provided that the matters remaining between the parties, including the 
payments due to the bank, Bahman's failure to pay rent and taxes, improperly subrenting the 
Property and denying the Noshiravans access to the Property, would be "amicably rectified 
after application of part A." Upon resolution of part B, all litigation and claims, would be 
dismissed. 
11. Because of the Agreement, Niloofar suspended foreclosure proceedings 
pending performance by Bahman and Zahra of part A of the Agreement and the amicable 
resolution of the remaining issues, including the payments due to the bank, required by part 
B. 
12. In 1999, Bahman and Zahra acknowledged the validity of the Agreement, but 
contended that all of its terms had been performed by them. Judge Puelar ruled in Civil 
#950901726 that the provisions of the Agreement were still binding and that they had not 
been fulfilled by Bahman and Zahra. 
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13. The remaining issues were not resolved and in February, 2002, Niloofar 
filed a notice of a trustee's sale (R. 63). 
14. In March, 2002, Bahman, who had subsequently obtained half of the Property 
from Ariazand and/or Zahra, (in spite of a prohibition of transfer contained in the trust deed) 
filed a complaint (R. 83-86) and obtained a preliminary injunction staying the trustee's sale. 
Niloofar answered Bahman's complaint and raised as affirmative defenses the timely 
commencement of the foreclosure proceedings, Bahman's acquisition of an interest in the 
Property in contravention of the terms of the trust deed and the execution of the Agreement 
(R. 33-39). Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court 
granted Niloofar's motion and dismissed the proceedings (R. 83-86). Bahman has appealed 
to this court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Niloofar timely commenced foreclosure proceedings in this matter. Plaintiff has the 
burden of proving the applicability to the statute of limitations and has not met that burden. 
The intervening contract between the various parties tolled the running of the statute. In 
addition, the agreement of Bahman and Zahra to rectify the late payments to the bank and 
Niloofar's reliance thereon created an equitable estoppel which prevents Bahman from 
asserting the statute of limitations or creates an acknowledgment of the debt, which starts 
the limitations period running anew. The decision of Judge Burton was correct. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE 
APPLICABILITY OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
As provided by Rule 9 (h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden of pleading 
and proving the applicability of the statute of limitations in this case rests on Plaintiff.1 
Plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations now blocks Niloofar's foreclosure action and 
that the subject note and trust deed are void. 
§78-12-23, UTAH CODE ANN. provides that: 
an action may be brought within six years . . . (2) upon any contract, 
obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing. 
§57-1-34, UTAH CODE ANN, provides: 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, or an action to 
foreclose the trust deed as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages 
on real property, shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for 
the commencement of an action on an obligations occurred by the trust deed. 
The general rule of law is cited in 51 AM JUR 2d, Limitation of Actions, §243, p. 
606-607 as follows: 
The timely commencement of an action to foreclose a right before the statute 
of limitations is run ordinarily suspends the running of the statute with regard 
to that particular action. Thus, if the preservation of rights depends upon 
beginning an action within a definite time, the one upon whom the initiative 
1
 Conder v. Hunt, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 105, 1 P.3d 558. 
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rests ordinarily keeps his or her right alive by making the appropriate move 
within the specified time. 
In this case, Niloofar began her foreclosure less than six years from the date of the 
last payment on the note by recording the notice of default well within the time period 
provided by the statute of limitations; therefore, her trust deed and the note are still alive 
and the foreclosure may proceed. 
Plaintiffs contention that the statute of limitations is applicable in this case is without 
merit. 
II 
THE INTERVENING CONTRACT TOLLED 
THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE 
The general rule is that a cause of action accrues upon "the happening of the last 
event necessary to . . . the cause of action."2 In December of 1997, Bahman, Zahra, 
Ariazand, Farhang and the Noshiravans entered into an agreement that specifically provided 
that the issue of the bank payments would be resolved once the other matters set forth in 
part A of the Agreement were satisfied. By executing the contract, Bahman represented that 
he intended to resolve the matter of late payments due to the bank (the obligation Niloofar 
had purchased in 1994) once his payment obligations to Salt Lake County and Farhang 
were satisfied. The parties agreed that the delinquent payments on the trust deed note, as 
2
 Becton-Dickerson & Company v. Reece, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983). 
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well as other issues between them, would be amicably resolved once part A of the 
Agreement had been completed. Part A was not completed. 
The Agreement specifically tolls the running of the statute until part A has been 
completed; therefore, even if the statute were applicable to this case, which it is not, it is 
tolled by the terms of the Agreement executed by Plaintiff. Application of the statute of 
limitations in this case is not appropriate. 
Ill 
BAHMANfS AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE THE LATE PAYMENTS 
CREATED AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel may deprive a party of the defense of the statute 
of limitations if the other party was induced to delay timely action by the promise of the 
other to settle, pay, perform or otherwise carry out the obligation or duty in question.3 
Niloofar relied upon the representations and promise of Bahman that he would 
rectify the problem of the late payments after satisfying the requirements of part A of the 
Agreement. Her reliance was reasonable and occurred within six years of the last payment 
on the debt. When Bahman failed to satisfy part A as promised, she immediately resumed 
her foreclosure efforts. 
3
 51 AM JUR 2d, Limitation of Actions, §391, p. 698. 
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THE AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED A GENERAL 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE DEBT AND STARTED 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNNING ANEW 
A promise to pay or an acknowledgment of the debt tolls the running of the statute of 
limitations and starts it running anew on the date of the promise or acknowledgment or on 
the date the promise is breached.4 If an acknowledgment or new promise is made before a 
debt is barred by the statute of limitations, it fixes a new date from which the limitations 
period runs.5 In December, 1997, Bahman, Zahra and others acknowledged the existence of 
the late payments due to the bank and promised that the matter would be amicably resolved 
after part A of the Agreement was satisfied. As such, the limitations period commenced to 
run anew, at the earliest, from December 1, 1997 to December 1, 2003. In 1999, in other 
litigation, Bahman and Zarha repeatedly acknowledged the validity of the Agreement, but 
contended that it had been fully performed. Judge Puelar ruled that the Agreement was 
binding, but that its terms had not been fully satisfied.6 It could be argued, therefore, that 
the statute of limitations did not actually begin to run until Judge Puelarfs ruling. Such a 
4
 51 AM JUR 2d, Limitation of Actions, §303, p. 645. 
5
 51 AM JUR 2d, Limitation of Actions, §307, p. 647. 
6
 Noshiravan v. Hajmohammadali, Third District Court, Case #950901726, Judge 
Puelar. 
determination is not necessary, however, since Defendant would have sold the property, had 
she not been restrained by the court, on April 10, 2002, well within the December 1, 2003 
deadline. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute of limitations is inapplicable in this case because a notice of default was 
filed within six years from the date of the last payment on the note. Even if the statute were 
applicable, which it is not, the Agreement tolled the statute pending a resolution of other 
issues mentioned therein. Equitable estoppel precludes Bahman from now asserting the 
statute of limitations because Niloofar reasonably relied upon Bahman's promise that the 
debt would be satisfied as soon as his obligations under part A of the Agreement were 
fulfilled. By signing the Agreement, Bahman acknowledged the existence of the debt and 
started a new limitations period, which runs out, at the earliest, on December 1, 2003. 
Judge Burton correctly ruled that summary judgment was appropriate in favor of 
Niloofar and that Niloofar could proceed with the sale of the subject property. 
DATED this /j(_ day of August, 2003. 
J. Thomas Bowen 
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ADDENDUM 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
On April 7, 1992 and February 25, 1996, two agreements were provided and 
signed between the parties and signers below which were never performed. Regarding 
maRy changes that happened in that agreement and the subject property described as 
a gas station and convenience store under the name of Smith's Gas & Video Fuel that 
require full consideration, this agreement replaces the former ones with the following 
explanatory: 
RECITALS 
Dr. Amir H. Noshiravan and IC Fakhretaj Noshiravan (hereinafter referred to 
as "Noshiravans") 
Amir Farhang Noshiravan (hereinafter referred to as "Farhang") 
Mansour Ariazand (hereinafter referred to as "Ariazand") 
Bahman Dadgari (hereinafter referred to as "Bahman") 
Zahra Haj Mohammadali (hereinafter referred to as "Mohammadali") 
WHEREAS the Noshiravans and Ariazand each owned one half of the above 
gas station and convenience store located at 4500 South Highland Drive (hereinafter 
referred to as aGas Station"); 
WHEREAS Mohammadali formerly owned one half, having her interest Quit 
Claimed to Ariazand; 
WHEREAS Bahman owned one-half ownership on the house on Spring Run 
Drive which he has transferred to his wife, Mohammadali, and she has transferred the 
entire property to Ariazand; 
WHEREAS Farhang commenced an action against Mohammadali and 
Ariazand (Third Judicial District Cases No. 904905144 and 950901726) seeking 
inter alia to set aside Mohammadali's transference of the properties to Ariazand as a 
fraudulent conveyance; 
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WHEREAS Ariazand has filed a counter claim against Farhang seeking to 
recover not less than $41,700 as unpaid rent payment from said property; 
WHEREAS Noshiravans incurred some expenses and attorney fees in 
connection with the above referenced litigations and property; 
WHEREAS the County Attorney on behalf of the Fire Department has filed 
Case No. 940903980 with the Third Judicial Court asking for $29,100 in damages 
incurred on that property; 
WHEREAS TW Company has filed a claim to recover the cost of cleaning the 
area in the amount of $19,000.00 (Case No. 940903980); 
WHEREAS the Court has issued a General Decision in favour of the Fire 
Department and TWC; and the parties in this actin have settled for a total of 
$25,000.00 to be paid to County and TWC; 
WHEREAS at a Pre Trial scheduled August 7, 1997 before the Honorable 
Judge David Young, attended by Thorn Bowen ^attorney for Farhang), Dr. Amir 
Noshiravan and Bahman Dadgari, as well as Craig Anderson (Deputy County 
Attorney) and Stephen Elgreen, a verbal settlement was concluded that the owners 
and Bahman, as runner of the business, pay 50% of both claims, in the approximate 
amount of $25,000.00; 
WHEREAS the County has filed another claim stating that in performing the 
project to widen Highland Drive, another 5,000 square feet of this property was 
needed; 
WHEREAS the Countv Appraiser assessed the entire property for 
$200,000.00; 
WHEREAS an offer has been received from John Park Assoc for $270,000.00, 
which $70,000.00 greater than the County Appraiser's assessment; 
WHEREAS the County has imposed a lien against the property either for 
$25,000.00 verbal settlement or condemnation claim; 
WHEREAS a claim is under negotiation between the Noshiravans and Bahman 
regarding the lack of monthly payments to U.S. National Bank, a mortgager, as well 
as other claim to close the Gas Station and collapse the price, and the other liens, etc. 
2 /c'M&t^j 
imposed on the property; 
WHEREAS a discussion has happened to possibly refer all the claims to 
arbitration; 
WHEREAS the parties are willing to solve the cases amicably and through 
direct negotiations, this Agreement is entered into and performed on this 25th day of 
November, 1997 between the parties as follows: 
PARTA 
1. Bahman and Zahra again mutually and collectively agreed to pay $50,000.00 
in cash. This amount has to be consummated as: 
A $25,000.00 to be spent to satisfy the settlement with the County Fire 
Department and TW Company as stated at the Pre Trial Court on 
August 7, 1997. 
B. $25,000.00 to satisfy part of the Fartiang claim. This amount would 
have to be paid by the end of 1997. 
PARTB 
The claims of Farhang regarding the balance of his credit based on the Court 
Judgment and the Noshiravans regarding the late rent, late payments to bank, late 
taxes, subrenting the property, decreasing the price, and locking the use, attorneys 
fees, and legal expenses, etc., should remain and will be amicably rectified after 
application of Part A. Between Farhang, Noshiravans, and BahmarilMohammadali in 
this manner the claims and fraudulent transactions between Mohammadali, Dadgari 
and Ariazand, as well as the counter claim of Ariazand against Farhang, would be 
dismissed with prejudice after performance of the above explanations. 
SALE OF PROPERTY 
In conjunction with the condemnation of the property by the County as 
explained in the above Agreement, because the County assessment is in contrary to 
the offer received for $270,000.00, even less than the County Tax Assessor ssdd, 
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$217,000.00, the owner agrees to hire an independent assessor and ask for an appeal 
and award the County for prospective future rent from the date of condemnation, as 
well as the acquisition of the entire property instead of part (said 5,000 square feet), 
the owner has to pay their own tax part before the end of November to prevent any 
penalty. And part of his assessor fee. With payment of $25,000 to satisfy the claims 
of the County and TW Company, the lien has to be removed, and Bahman &. 
Mohammad Ali collectively have to remove any other liens on the property, leaving it 
with a clear title. After the execution of this Agreement, the claims should be 
dismissed with prejudice, (clear title does not include Niloofar Bakhti's Mortgage). 
As stated in former documents, a copy of this Agreement should be filed with 
the Honorable Sandra Feuler. Then no need for arbitration. Dated this 1st.day of 
December, 1997 in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
- -$&><&&/t'ty 
'Dr. Amir H. Noshiravan M ansour Axiazarfd/ 
F-A/D$H(J?A\J AA/ 
Fakhretaj Noshiravan Bahman Dadg 
Amir Farhang Noshiravan Zahra Haj Mohammadali (Dadgari) 
<?-,*'•+ JJ^ 
a 
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